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The purpose of this thesis is to determine the threats that social media and social 
navigation (SMSN) pose to the surface transportation system. The research catalogs the 
types of threats and SMSN’s vulnerabilities, and uncovers terrorists’ malign use of social 
media for intelligence gathering. Academic researchers have already discovered threats in 
social navigation platforms such as Waze and Google Maps; Sybil and man-in-the-
middle attacks allow malicious actors to create traffic congestion and alternate vehicle 
routing. While this has not yet caused an attributable security concern to the vehicle 
surface transportation system, in the hands of malicious actors, these vulnerabilities could 
be exploited to orchestrate an attack that devastates infrastructure and risks human lives. 
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Traffic congestion during commuting hours (7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. and 4:00 
P.M. to 6:00 P.M.) is as much a guarantee as death and taxes. Sitting in traffic gridlock 
consumes valuable free time, adds pollutants to the air, and reduces overall quality of 
life.1 Developers from the mobile application (app) world have created apps such as 
Waze and Google Maps that not only link traffic navigation software to near-real-time 
Global Positioning System (GPS) updates, but also to live, crowdsourced traffic 
information provided by fellow commuters; this information is designed to reduce traffic 
congestion and help commuters avoid traffic snarls or obstacles.2 Mobile apps like Waze 
and Google Maps can be considered social navigation. 
Unfortunately, there is little research regarding the impact of social media and 
social navigation (SMSN) specific to surface transportation security. Likewise, research 
evaluating the influence of SMSN on human or “user” behavior and the associated 
vulnerabilities to the transportation system is also lacking. Perhaps the impact of SMSN 
apps on surface transportation has not been explored in more depth because the focus has 
primarily been on transportation infrastructure—bridges, overpasses, highways—and 
transportation control systems. However, SMSN apps should be considered an integral 
part of the surface transportation system; the information that users contribute and 
distribute influences human behavior and the resulting behavior of the transportation 
system itself. 
This thesis catalogs malign SMSN tools, tactics, and techniques that pose a 
security risk to surface transportation. It is hoped that this analysis may lead to a heuristic 
inquiry that could expose malign activities before they present a threat to the surface 
transportation system. 
To address the threats that SMSN pose to the surface transportation system, this 
thesis provides a qualitative analysis of the system’s specific SMSN-related 
                                                 
1 This information is based on my experience as a traffic and transportation engineer. 
2 “Crowdsourced Traffic Apps: Saving Commuters from Traffic Jam Torture,” Scratch, February 10, 
2015, http://www.scratchmarketing.com/crowdsourced-traffic-apps/. 
 xvi 
vulnerabilities by conducting a thorough and systematic review of academic journals, 
books, white papers, websites, and open-source information from popular social media 
and social navigation sites such as Twitter, Facebook, and Waze. Vulnerabilities/threats 
are cataloged by existing and known vulnerabilities, and potential malign uses of SMSN 
tools and tactics that have not yet been attempted. The data is further grouped into three 
categories: SMSN manipulation, social navigation manipulation, and use of SMSN for 
intelligence. 
No conclusive evidence was found that social media is a direct threat to the 
surface transportation system. However, there is implied potential for social media’s 
exploitation by terrorist groups and individuals. Of most concern is that these groups or 
individuals will disseminate false information to control the narrative or behavior of 
social groups, or that they will use legitimate information as a source of intelligence. For 
example, when Twitter users post their sentiments regarding traffic conditions, malicious 
actors can use this tactical knowledge to attack the surface transportation system. 
Researchers have discovered that social navigation applications, such as Waze 
and Google Maps, are vulnerable to Sybil and man-in-the-middle attacks.3 A Sybil attack 
exploits trust vulnerabilities in web and mobile application platforms that depend on user 
interaction and crowdsourced information by disregarding terms of use agreements 
(which preclude the deliberate introduction of false information) through imposter 
identities.4 These imposter identities can present false or alternative information that 
incorrectly guides users in a manner desired by the malicious actor. Waze, for example, 
will suggest alternate travel routes should the targeted route have a comparatively longer 
travel time.5 Should the Sybil attack trigger traffic congestion, malicious actors can lure 
unsuspecting motorists into “kill boxes” to orchestrate an attack. While social media apps 
                                                 
3 Gang Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices in Crowdsourced Mapping Services,” paper 
presented at MobiSys ‘16, Singapore, June 25–30, 2016; Meital Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social 
Navigation (Haifa, Israel: The Technion, 2014); Tobias Jeske, “Floating Car Data from Smartphones—
What Google and Waze Know about You and How Hackers Can Control Traffic,” paper presented at Black 
Hat Europe, Amsterdam, March 12–15, 2013. 
4 “Terms of Use,” Waze, accessed July 14, 2016, https://www.waze.com/legal/tos; “Google Maps/
Google Earth Additional Terms of Service,” Google, December 17, 2015, https://www.google.com/intl/
ALL/help/terms_maps.html. 
5 Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices,” 4 
 xvii 
such as Waze and Google Maps are not typical platforms for terrorism, surface 
transportation does represent a soft target with high potential for large-scale casualties.6 
A Sybil attack on one of these apps could provide a new target vector for terrorists, 
rendering highway infrastructure or passenger vehicles an attractive soft target. This 
would be especially devastating in the United States, where motor vehicles are the 
predominant mode of travel, with potential attacks impacting tens of millions of urban 
commuters daily.7  
In the near future, terrorist or criminal Sybil attacks could target autonomous 
vehicles, which are expected to communicate with transportation infrastructure to ensure 
efficient and safe traffic flow.8 A Sybil or man-in-the-middle attack on the traffic 
infrastructure and/or vehicular network could communicate false vehicle characteristic 
information or false traffic infrastructure information, causing vehicle conflicts and 
accidents at intersections. Homeland security professionals must be prepared to address 
these vulnerabilities as the future of vehicle surface transportation becomes an 
increasingly interconnected network. 
  
                                                 
6 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Troubling Trends in Terrorism and Attacks on 
Surface Transportation: The Outlook is Grim, but People Still Have a Great Deal of Control (San Jose, 
CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2015), 2. 
7 Tom Huddleston, Jr. “These U.S. Cities Have the Worst Commute Times,” Fortune, March 3, 2016, 
http://fortune.com/2016/03/03/us-cities-average-commute-time/. 
8 Rupesh Gunturu, “Survey of Sybil Attacks in Social Networks,” Cornell University Library, accessed 
April 15, 2016, http://arxiv.org/pdf/1504.05522v1.pdf; “Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) Communications 
for Safety,” U.S. Department of Transportation, accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/
v2isafety_factsheet.htm. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Traffic congestion during commuting hours (7:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. and 4:00 
P.M. to 6:00 P.M.) is as much a guarantee as death and taxes. Sitting in gridlock 
consumes valuable free time, adds pollutants to the air, and reduces overall quality of 
life.1 So, how do everyday commuters avoid sitting in traffic for several hours? 
Fortunately, there have been advances in Web 2.0 technology to help ease commuters’ 
frustration. Developers from the mobile application (app) world have created apps such 
as Waze and Google Maps that not only link traffic navigation software to near-real-time 
Global Positioning System (GPS) updates, but also to live, crowdsourced traffic 
information provided by fellow commuters; this information is designed to reduce traffic 
congestion and help commuters avoid traffic snarls or obstacles.2 Navigation apps like 
Waze have become popular because they offer commuters alternative transportation 
choices. It is estimated that “over 50 million active users log into Waze monthly,” which 
is a testament to the popularity and utility of navigation apps.3 Waze, in particular, is 
actively looking to partner with state and local transportation agencies in the spirit of 
sharing transportation data to reach as many road users as possible.4 The imminent 
partnership is evidence that the growing navigation app market is becoming part of the 
surface transportation system.  
Social networks and social media have proven to be effective tools for influencing 
human behavior.5 A simple Google search of “social media’s influence on human 
                                                 
1 This information is based on my experience as a traffic and transportation engineer. 
2 “Crowdsourced Traffic Apps: Saving commuters from traffic jam torture,” Scratch, February 10, 
2015, http://www.scratchmarketing.com/crowdsourced-traffic-apps/. 
3 Sarah Perez, “Navigation App Waze Gets a Huge Redesign-Now Less Cluttered, but Still Needs 
Improvement,” Tech Crunch, last modified October 19, 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2015/10/19/
navigation-app-waze-gets-a-huge-redesign-now-less-cluttered-but-still-needs-improvement/#.zpel8b:KuBe. 
4 Neal Underleider, “Waze Is Driving into City Hall,” Fast Company, last modified April 15, 2015, 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3045080/waze-is-driving-into-city-hall. 
5 Dick Dahl, “Experts Explore How Social Networks Can Influence Behavior and Decision Making,” 
video, Harvard Law School, February 15, 2013, http://today.law.harvard.edu/experts-explore-how-social-
networks-can-influence-behavior-and-decision-making-video/. 
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behavior” yields pages of blogs and scholarly articles analyzing this phenomenon. The 
importance of social networks and social media have long been recognized and exploited 
by terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A report by 
Lieutenant Commander Nathan K. Schneider of the U.S. Navy describes the proficiency 
with which ISIS uses social media: 
Social media integration has been pivotal in ISIS’s success at the 
operational level of war in Iraq and Syria. Demonstrating a keen ability to 
achieve a unity of effort, ISIS has been successful at synchronizing its 
social media efforts with its military operations in Iraq.6 
Further, ISIS capitalizes on trending news information by co-opting trending hashtags 
(the hash character or pound sign preceding a word).7 Co-opting hashtags thrusts ISIS to 
the front of news media and extends their terrorist message to the masses.8 
Unfortunately, research regarding the impact of social media and social 
navigation (SMSN) specific to surface transportation security is minimal. Likewise, 
research evaluating the influence of SMSN on human or “user” behavior and the 
resulting vulnerabilities to the transportation system is also lacking. Thus, our 
understanding of the threats SMSN pose to the surface transportation system is limited. 
While technological improvements such as social navigation apps can improve 
efficiencies in the surface transportation system, their malicious use could result in 
immediate repercussions, such as increased traffic congestion, increased traffic collisions, 
or deliberate rerouting of traffic for criminal or terrorism purposes. At the extreme, social 
navigation apps could provide intelligence to coordinate a vehicle-borne explosion, 
which could destroy city infrastructure and cause mass casualties.  
                                                 
6 Nathan K. Schneider, ISIS and Social Media—The Combatant Commander’s Guide to Countering 
ISIS’s Social Media Campaign (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2015), 13. 
7 Alexander Trowbridge, “ISIS Swiping Hashtags as Part of Propaganda Efforts,” CBSNews, August 
26, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-hijacks-unrelated-hashtags-in-attempt-to-spread-message/. 
8 Ibid. 
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1. Not a New Concern 
Malicious exploitation of social navigation applications is not a new concern. In 
2015, Malaysian politician Datuk Raime Ungii, in a statement to the Malaysian 
parliament, expressed, “Terrorist groups may easily be able to access our location. They 
may monitor the public and important figures through it.”9 He goes on to assert that, “We 
need to know the reach of these apps and I will continue to ask questions when there is 
space for it in [lower parliament].”10 
In 2014, students from the Technion University in Israel created false Waze user 
accounts, which they used to manipulate and plant false information in order to influence 
the movement of traffic and create gridlock throughout Technion.11 This is an example of 
how navigation apps can be deliberately exploited to affect social behavior. While the 
app was manipulated for a research project and not with malicious intent, the students’ 
work uncovered vulnerabilities to the surface transportation system. Aware of this Waze 
hack project, author and former staff director of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Dr. Stephen Bryen, expressed his concerns on his Technology and Security 
blog: 
If Waze can be faked, it can be used to set traps that could prove fatal. In 
Israel it is a genuine threat-risk. For example, Hamas and Hezbollah, not 
to mention the Syrian Electronic Army and its equivalent in Iran, and 
probably Isis too, can spoof an app like Waze and use it to lead both 
military, police and private citizens into ambushes.12 
Similar concerns exist in the United States, where motor vehicle use far exceeds 
public transportation use.13 Waze is one of the most popular traffic navigation 
                                                 
9 Veena Babulal, “Apps Like Waze and Google Map Risk national security with rise of IS?,” New 
Straits Times Online, November 27, 2015, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/11/114220/apps-waze-and-
google-map-risk-national-security-rise. 
10 Ibid. 
11 David Greenway, “Students Fake a Traffic Jam in Waze to Clear Their Route,” htxt.africa, accessed 
July 8, 2015, http://www.htxt.co.za/2014/03/26/students-fake-a-traffic-jam-in-waze-to-clear-their-route/. 
12 Stephen Byren, “Waze, Qalandia and Social Media Danger,” Technology and Security, March 1, 
2016, https://technologysecurity.wordpress.com/2016/03/01/waze-qalandiya-and-social-media-danger/. 
13 Ralph Buehler, “9 Reasons the U.S. Ended up So Much More Car-Dependent Than Europe, 
CityLab, February 4, 2014, http://www.citylab.com/commute/2014/02/9-reasons-us-ended-so-much-more-
car-dependent-europe/8226/. 
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applications, with an estimated 5.5 million users in the United States in 2013.14 Waze use 
will only continue to grow as motorists seek routes to circumvent traffic, and thus the 
opportunity to manipulate users in the United States is also likely to grow. 
2. Significance of the Research 
Threats to surface transportation infrastructure have long been on the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s mind; surface transportation is one of sixteen sectors 
under the purview of their authority. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
is well aware that malicious actors and terrorists can pose a threat to the U.S. highway 
system.15 In a threat assessment report, the TSA asserts that the use of improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs, and explosives on ships or bridges are 
common and expected terrorist tactics.16 However, the assessment contains only a brief 
description of cyber threats to the transportation system, despite acknowledging that Al 
Qaeda and other groups may have the ability to wreak havoc on supervisory control and 
data acquisition systems used to remotely operate vital infrastructure.17 
Researchers Pamela Murray-Tuite and Xiang Fe have examined risks to the 
transportation network using attacker-defender analysis.18 They analyzed several 
potential targets—ranging from government facilities, bridges, highways, shopping malls, 
and office buildings—and the impact that disabling one or more targets would have on 
the supporting transportation network. Murray-Tuite and Fe’s examined targets are 
considered traditional transportation infrastructure; what they did not consider are the 
potential security implications of traffic navigation apps.   
                                                 
14 Shaul Zohar, “Report—Users—WAZE—2013—United States, Europe, Asia & Latin America,” 
Evolita, September 18, 2014, http://alpha.evolita.com/Research/Subject/WAZE-Users-Europe-Asia-Latin-
America-United-States-Y2013. 
15 Alan Hickson, Terrorist Threat to U.S. Highway Systems (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, 2006), 1–2. 
16 Hickson, Terrorist Threat to U.S. Highway Systems, 1–2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Pamela Murray-Tuite and Xiang Fe, “A Methodology for Assessing Transportation Network 
Terrorism Risk with Attacker-Defender Interactions,” Computer-Aided Civil Engineering 25, no. 6 (August 
2010): 396–410. 
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For the 2011 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications, a group of 
researchers reviewed vulnerabilities to transportation network links and the effects of a 
possible attack.19 The researchers examined motorists’ travel times, and the economic 
impacts of motorists using alternate routes to avoid a failed transportation network link. 
Their study also attempted to rank the importance of transportation links; in the event of a 
link failure due to a natural disaster or other catastrophic event, this ranking system can 
help transportation planners determine which critical transportation links are needed to 
restore operations or to make the transportation system more resilient. Again, however, 
vulnerabilities related to traffic navigational apps were not examined. Future analysis of 
transportation network or infrastructure security should consider these apps because they 
have become integral to the operation of surface transportation. 
Further, an article for TechTarget points out that computerized traffic signal 
systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks.20 The TechTarget authors claim that about two-
thirds of transportation security practitioners are not prepared for cyberattacks on 
computerized elements of the transportation system.21 For example, intelligent 
transportation systems (ITS) technology incorporates various edge communication 
devices, such as routers and switches, to transmit data between a transportation 
management center and the local traffic signal controller.22 Unfortunately, many ITS 
systems were designed by traffic and transportation engineers who did not have the 
foresight to include basic cyber security concepts, such as system encryption.23 By 
penetrating a central traffic signal operating system through switches and routers, a 
malicious actor can alter traffic signal timing patterns that result in accidents or increased 
traffic congestion. 
                                                 
19 Saleh Ibrahim et al., “An Efficient Heuristic for Estimating Transportation Network Vulnerability,” 
2011 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC): 1092–1098. 
20 Stephen Barlas et al., “U.S. Critical Infrastructure Security: Highlighting Critical Infrastructure 
Threats,” TechTarget, accessed March 3, 2016, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/US-critical-
infrastructure-security-Highlighting-critcal-infrastructure-threats. 
21Ibid. 
22 This is based on my experience as a traffic and transportation engineer. 
23 Ibid. 
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Perhaps the impact of SMSN apps on surface transportation has not been explored 
in more depth because the focus has primarily been on transportation infrastructure—
bridges, overpasses, highways—and transportation control systems. However, SMSN 
apps should be considered an integral part of the surface transportation system; the 
information that users contribute and distribute influences human behavior and the 
resulting behavior of the transportation system itself. A comprehensive understanding of 
how SMSN platforms impact transportation security should be pursued as vigorously as 
any other component of the surface transportation system. Identifying related threats will 
contribute to the overall foundation of surface transportation security literature. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis seeks to answer the following broad research question: 
What threats do SMSN pose to the surface transportation system? 
Two sub-questions, or parts, feed into this broad research question: 
A. What are the existing and known vulnerabilities of surface transportation 
systems to online threats? 
B. What are the hypothetical vulnerabilities of these systems? 
Part A specifically examines SMSN vulnerabilities that could threaten (U.S.) urban 
vehicle surface transportation and highway/road infrastructure. This section catalogs both 
successful and thwarted attacks, hacks, and disruptions to transportation systems. Part B 
explores potential vulnerabilities/threats/attacks that have not yet been exploited or 
attempted. These are largely based on vulnerabilities discovered throughout the research 
process that could disrupt surface transportation systems. Exposing these vulnerabilities 
could enable the development of a more resilient surface transportation system through 
enhanced security and awareness. Further, it provides homeland security professionals a 




This thesis employs a qualitative methodology that includes a thorough and 
systematic review of academic journals, books, white papers, and websites. Additional 
data was gathered from technology-based conferences and blogs. Open-source 
information from popular social media and social navigation sites such as Twitter, 
Nextdoor, Waze, Inrix, and Twittraffic also provided information that could be analyzed 
to reveal vulnerabilities in the transportation system. 
The research yields data that exposes vulnerabilities to the transportation system 
exploited by the use of SMSN. These vulnerabilities can include, but are not limited to, 
hacking, posting of misinformation, intelligence gathering by malicious actors, and 
unintended consequences of misuse. Data collected is cataloged by known vulnerabilities 
and potential malign uses of tools and tactics. 
A detailed description of the methodology is included in Chapter III. 
D. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
This thesis comprises six chapters. After this chapter (which has provided a 
thematic introduction and foundation for the research), Chapter II presents a literature 
review of social media exploitation and social navigation exploitation, and their 
associated security or operational impacts on the transportation system. Chapter III 
describes the methods and sources of information from which this research is derived. 
Chapter IV reveals the information discovered from the research and categorizes the data. 
Chapter V presents a discussion of the findings and describes discovered trends regarding 
SMSN threats to the surface transportation system. Chapter VI provides conclusions and 
suggestions for future research, and answers the research question. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Terrorists’ relationship with social media is similar to that of average citizens. 
Terrorists use social media because it is free, easy to use, and the available information is 
reliable enough to inform decisions for attack planning.24 Gabriel Weimann, an expert on 
terrorists’ use of social media, states that terrorists most commonly use social media to 
spread propaganda, promote radicalization, and recruit new members.25 Researchers 
Catherine A. Theohary and John Rollins confirm Weimann’s observations, additionally 
noting that terrorists are developing an ability to circumvent cyber-security measures and 
conduct cyberattacks.26 Unequivocally, terrorists are building a capacity to use social 
media that warrants homeland security professionals’ preparation. The remainder of this 
chapter explores how social media and social navigation platforms can be exploited for 
malign use. For the purposes of this thesis, malicious actors, terrorists, and dark networks 
are the groups that are conducting illegal activities.27 
A. SOCIAL MEDIA EXPLOITATION 
The evolution of social media has given malicious actors new territory on which 
to conduct operations, and has therefore presented security professionals with new 
challenges.28 According to Katya Drozdova and Michael Somilov, social media is an 
optimal operational frontier for terror networks because its speed is tremendously fast, its 
reach of communication far and numerous, and its methods efficient.29 Social media also 
                                                 
24 Paulina Wu, “Impossible to Regulate: Social Media, Terrorists and a Role for the U.N.,” Chicago 
Journal of International Law 16, no.1, (2015): 288. 
25 Gabriel Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2014), 3. 
26 Catherine A. Theohary and John Rollins, Terrorist Use of the internet: Information Operations in 
Cyberspace (CRS Report No. R41674) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 5. 
27 Jorg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 13, no. 4, (2003): 414, doi: 10.1029/jopart/mug029. 
28 Marc Goodman, Future Crimes: Everything Is Connected, Everyone Is Vulnerable and What We 
Can Do about it (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2014), Kindle location 2030–2032.  
29 Katya Drozdova and Michael Samoilov, “Predictive Analysis of Concealed Social Network 
Activities Based on Communication Technology Choices: Early-Warning Detection of Attack Signals from 
Terrorist Organizations,” Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 16, no. 1 (March 2009): 
64–65. 
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allows terror networks to spread their ideology and messages unimpeded by borders or 
national laws.30 
Drozdova and Somilov further contend that the methods of communication 
among dark networks—direct contact, telephone, or internet—can indicate early warning 
signs of an impending attack.31 The article references the traceability and level of 
covertness based on the communication technology used. For example, low-tech 
communications such as face-to-face meetings, letters, or signals indicate a higher degree 
of covertness, while hi-tech communications (e.g., internet, mobile phone, social media) 
have a higher degree of traceability and vulnerability, but increase task efficiency. The 
authors applied signals analysis to both low- and hi-tech means of communication and 
determined that low-tech communications yielded higher indicators of attack 
precursors.32 Their research reveals that a first priority of actors in a dark network is to 
stay undetected. The use of open social media sites for communication can therefore be 
counterproductive, because information is publicly available and easily obtained. 
However, because hi-tech communication can facilitate quicker action, dark networks 
seek to balance covertness and quick action.33 
Social media has also demonstrated the ability to influence individuals’ behavior. 
In his book, Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What it Means 
for Business, Science and Everyday Life, Albert Lazslo-Barabasi describes the 
importance of connectors or connections in social networks.34 Connectors, he explains, 
can establish trends and bring different groups of people together.35 Lazslo-Barabasi’s 
concepts apply to social networks on the web as well as traditional social networks. In 
                                                 
30 Yigal Carmon, Steven Stalinsky, “Terrorist Use of U.S. Social Media is a National Security Threat,” 
Forbes, January 30, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/01/30/terrorist-use-of-u-s-social-
media-is-a-national-security-threat/2/ 
31 Drozdova and Samoilov, “Predictive Analysis,” 63. 
32 Ibid., 85. 
33 Ibid., 64; Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), xxvi. 
34 Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked—How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What it 
Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York: Plume-Penguin Group, 2002), 56. 
35 Ibid. 
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2012, a Behavior Computing article confirmed Lazslo-Barabasi’s assertion and analyzed 
social media users’ behaviors, as well as the influence users have on the online 
community.36 The article suggests that, although behavior resulting from exposure to 
social media sites varies depending on the purpose of the site, the behaviors’ various 
characteristics and tendencies remain consistent.37 For example, influential users tend to 
gravitate toward each other to generate even greater influence over an online 
community.38 The article confirms that the use of social media by charismatic actors with 
well-crafted messages motivates behavior among a network of followers and individuals 
looking for a place in their society.  
Malicious actors can also use social media to impersonate and render false 
information to control the narrative to their benefit.39 Controlling the narrative gives 
malicious actors unchecked power to influence human behavior in their social network. 
In a policy memo for the Commons Lab at the Wilson Center, Rebecca Goolsby uses the 
term “Social Cyber Attack” to reflect how a crowd, or social network, can be influenced 
by “inflammatory information and disinformation.”40 A “Social Cyber Attack” can cause 
mass confusion and unwarranted agitation among the populous, leading to unmanageable 
chaos.41  
On the other hand, terrorists have also used social media to maintain situational 
awareness during their illegal activities.42 During the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, terrorists 
“maintained information superiority,” but also obtained “up-to-date situational 
information by systematically monitoring mainstream media and [social media] web-
                                                 
36 Nitin Agarwal et al., “Analyzing Behavior of the Influentials Across Social Media,” in Behavior 
Computing: Modeling Analysis, Mining and Decision, edited by Longbing Cao and Philip S. Yu, 3–19 
(New York: Springer: 2012). 
37 Agarwal et al., “Analyzing Behavior,” 4–5. 
38 Ibid., 17. 
39 George Chamales, Towards Trustworthy Social Media and Crowdsourcing (Washington, DC: 
Wilson Center, 2013), 8. 
40 Rebecca Goolsby, On Cybersecurity, Crowdsourcing, and Social Cyber-Attack (Washington, DC: 
Wilson Center, 2013), 3. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Onook Oh, Manish Agrawal, and H. Raghav Rao, “Information Control and Terrorism: Tracking 
the Mumbai terrorist Attack through Twitter,” Information Systems Front 13, no. 1 (March 2011): 33. 
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sites.”43 Overall, Web 2.0 enabled the Mumbai terrorists to stay ahead of authorities, 
which ultimately strengthened their attacks.44 Because social media is designed to share 
and distribute information openly, it is extremely difficult to determine if it is being used 
for malicious purposes. 
Analysts soon realized that it was necessary to leverage social media in order to 
keep up with terror networks’ operations and growth.45 Thus, new analytical methods 
with roots in social network analysis (SNA) are currently being evaluated for their 
predictive capabilities.46 Technosocial Predictive Analysis (TPA) is one such method, 
introduced by Maged Kamel Boulos, Antonio Sanfilippo, Courtney Corley, and Steve 
Wheeler in 2010.47 In short, TPA is a range of tools and methods that anticipate groups’ 
actions to minimize surprises.48 Their analysis focused on participants within the techno-
society who are more communicative in an online environment.49 TPA, which can be 
used to mine data from social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, is a 
multidisciplinary approach that combines physical and human factors to understand the 
human decision making process. Predicative policing, for instance, is a form of TPA; it 
takes into account individuals’ and groups’ social media activities, friendships, past 
criminal behaviors, and known group boundaries.50 These factors help law enforcement 
understand how a person’s or group’s decision could lead to potential illegal activities, 
thus enabling law enforcement to proactively address emergent activities.  
                                                 
43 Oh, Agrawal, and Rao, “Information Control and Terrorism,” 36. 
44 Ibid., 38. 
45 John Curtis Amble, “Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 35, no. 5, (2012): 346, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.666819. 
46 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks. 
47 Maged Kamel Boulos et al., “Social Web Mining and Exploitation for Serious Applications: 
Technosocial Predictive Analytics and Related Technologies for Public Health, Environmental and 
National security Surveillance,” Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine 100, no. 1 (October 
2010): 16–23, doi: 10.1016/j.cmpb.2010.02.007. 
48 Boulos et al., “Social Web Mining and Exploitation,” 19. 
49 Ibid. 
50 John Eligon and Timothy Williams, “Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely to 
Commit Crimes,” New York Times, September 24, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com. 
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Because social media and web data-mining provide open-source, easily accessible 
information, they can greatly contribute to the overall homeland and national security 
landscape.51 SNA complements social media web mining; relationship ties can 
sometimes be determined through open-source information.52 Researchers France and 
Christopher Cheong examined this relationship by analyzing tweets during the 2010–
2011 floods in Australia.53 They were able to identify influential Twitter users during the 
floods and the users’ methods for collecting and distributing information to their 
followers.54 Had Australian emergency responders understood this information, they 
could have used it to preposition response assets, or to disseminate pre-developed 
emergency response messaging. 
The next critical step toward applying SNA to social media is to develop 
mechanisms or systems that can perform predictive or analytic processes. To do so, 
Gregory Freeman and Robert Schroeder of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Common 
Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab evaluated off-the-shelf and government-
owned social media analysis software.55 Their evaluation provided a framework for 
analyzing social media and the actors who participate in its networks, and suggestions for 
the tailored application of analytic tools based upon situational criteria. SNA involves 
gathering and fusing data, and then applying metrics to better understand network 
behavior; Freeman and Schroeder contend that analysis should combine social network 
analytic tools (e.g., Ora, UCINET, Pajek) and methods in order to best graphically depict 
the network and its behavior.56 
                                                 
51 Mark Hosenball, “Homeland Security Watches Twitter, Social Media,” Reuters, January 11, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-homelandsecurity-websites-idUSTRE80A1RC20120111 
52 France Cheong and Christopher Cheong, “Social Media Data Mining: A Social Network Analysis 
of Tweets during the 2010–2011 Australian Floods,” paper presented at the Pacific Asian Conference on 
Information Systems, Brisbane, Australia, July 7–11, 2011. 
53 Cheong and Cheong, “Social Media Data Mining.” 
54 Ibid., 12. 
55 Gregory Freeman and Robert Schroeder, Social Media Exploitation: An Assessment (Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). 
56 Freeman and Schroeder, Social Media Exploitation, 48. 
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Researchers have also used social media to assess the impact of natural and 
manmade disasters on affected communities.57 Kathryn Blackmond Laskey conducted 
two controlled experiments: the first experiment simulated a group protest that became 
violent; in the second experiment, a fictional terrorist group posted threatening messages 
to a college and county website.58 The objective of these experiments was to determine if 
social media is advantageous to responders, decision makers, policy makers, and citizens 
during or in the aftermath of an emergency.59 Overall, the study generally demonstrated 
the benefits of using social media both for those who crowdsourced the information 
(citizens) and those who used the information to plan and execute tactical response 
(emergency responders). Emergency responders found that, through social media, 
citizens provided them enhanced situational awareness; this crowdsourced information 
helped them make more informed decisions. For the affected citizens, social media 
provided a real-time assessment of emergency responders’ performance during the 
incident.60 The study showed that emergency responders developed a certain level of 
trust in the information provided by social media, and therefore found the use of social 
media in emergency response valuable.61 Laskey did not, however, evaluate the effects of 
malign use of crowdsourced information. If a social media source identifies a false 
emergency or call for help, pursuing the misinformation can cause disruptions in 
legitimate response operations, putting citizens and operators in harm’s way.62  
                                                 
57 Takeshi Sakai et al., “The Possibility of Social Media Analysis for Disaster Management,” paper 
presented at the  2013 IEEE Region 10 Humanitarian Technology Conference (R10-HTC), Sendai, Japan, 
August 26–29, 2013, 238–243. 
58 Kathryn Blackmond Laskey, “Crowdsourced Decision Response for Emergency Responders,” paper 
presented at the 18th International Command and Control Research & Technology Symposium, Alexandria, 
VA, June 19–21, 2013. 
59 Laskey, “Crowdsourced Decision Response.” 
60 Ibid., 8–10. 
61 Ibid., 11. 
62 Bruce R. Lindsay, Social Media and Disasters: Current Uses, Future Options, and Policy 
Considerations (CRS Report No. R41987) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 7. 
 15 
B. SOCIAL NAVIGATION 
Can analytical methods help determine if malicious actors are using social media 
sites to exploit human behavior and compromise transportation security? As mentioned 
previously, there is limited literature addressing the effects of social media on 
transportation security. Further research is needed to determine if SNA and geospatial 
analysis can shed light on security vulnerabilities posed by social navigation apps such as 
Waze. Analysis could focus on measuring the influence an individual user can have on 
the behavior of the wider commuter population, and if that user can maliciously influence 
travel patterns. The students from Technion University in Israel (introduced in Chapter I) 
have provided a good start. By creating impostor accounts, the students were able to re-
route commuters using algorithms that programmed false GPS locations, false 
crowdsourced information, and false traffic congestion on alternative routes.63 They 
concluded that terrorists now have the ability to distinguish transportation modes, and to 
manipulate crowdsourcing data on Waze or similar social navigation applications; 
terrorists could use this ability to orchestrate a gridlocked highway, facilitating an attack 
on the transportation system or affected areas.  
In 2015, Gang Wang et al. further explored the potential malign use of Waze.64 
They observed that Waze uses weighted average algorithms to determine the most 
efficient path for navigation. Exploiting this through programming, the researchers then 
artificially introduced “slower” vehicle speeds, causing a traffic jam.65 To prolong the 
congestion, they simply introduced additional “slower” vehicles into the area. The 
researchers also found that they could “hide” actual traffic congestion by programming 
“faster”-moving vehicles, thus falsely depicting free-flow traffic, which could entice 
users to take an obstructed route.66 Malicious actors could potentially use this technique 
                                                 
63 Meital Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation (Haifa, Israel: The Technion, 2014). 
64 Gang Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices in Crowdsourced Mapping Services,” paper 
presented at MobiSys ‘16, Singapore, June 25–30, 2016. 
65 Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices,” 4. 
66 Ibid., 5. 
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to either draw a large number of motorists into a dense area or to create traffic congestion 
in order to carry out a violent act on a large, condensed group. 
Wang et al. also discussed a “man-in-the-middle” tactic that could effectively 
intercept communications between a mobile phone and Waze servers.67 This technique 
essentially allows a malicious actor to replicate a Waze user’s account in order to 
replicate thousands more accounts, and to potentially gain access to Waze servers, 
allowing the malicious actor to severely disrupt traffic behavior. Furthermore, they 
discovered that a Waze user’s GPS location can be queried by identifying an individual 
and refreshing the app to locate and track their movements.68 An individual can be 
tracked with enhanced accuracy through multiple falsely generated Waze accounts.69 
This technique, rather than affecting a large group of motorists, allows malicious actors 
to remotely stalk potential victims in a more target-specific manner. 
C. SYNERGIES 
Manipulating Waze demonstrates how SMSN can negatively impact 
transportation security. The Waze user community presents an excellent opportunity for 
SNA and social media analysis. There are no leaders among Waze users, but users are 
assigned value ratings when a traffic incident is reported—an individual’s value rating 
increases when another Waze user confirms the reported incident, thus increasing the 
reporting user’s credibility.70 A high-credibility user might wield greater influence on the 
Waze community’s larger driving behaviors, thereby affecting navigation patterns. A 
qualitative approach to analyzing social media exploitation and social navigation can be a 
first step in identifying potential related vulnerabilities to transportation security.  
                                                 
67 Ibid., 4. 
68 Ibid., 5. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Chris Matysczyk, “Cops Accused of Fiddling with Their Locations on Waze to Fool Drivers,” 
CNET, February 12, 2015, http://cnet.com/news/miami-cops-use-tech-to-fool-drivers-into-believing-theyre-
not-there/. 
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D. CLOSING THE GAP 
A gap still exists in current literature regarding specific impacts of SMSN on 
transportation security, particularly related to surface transportation systems. The study of 
surface transportation security within the context of a larger transportation infrastructure 
may contribute to a greater understanding of vulnerabilities and counter-measures 
associated with SMSN exploitation. In this context, the greater threat posed to public 
safety by the malign exploitation of SMSN vulnerabilities should also be explored. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The research question—“What threats do SMSN pose to the surface 
transportation system?”—frames and guides the scope of this research. This thesis 
employs a qualitative analysis of surface transportation’s vulnerabilities to malign use of 
SMSN applications in order to examine this question.  
A. RELATIONSHIPS 
The research first seeks to discover the relationship social networking, social 
media, and social navigation have with the surface transportation system. Merriam-
Webster defines “relationship” as “the way in which two or more people, groups, 
countries, etc., talk to, behave toward, and deal with each other.”71 For the purposes of 
this thesis, we seek to establish how SMSN and transportation “behave toward, and deal 
with each other,” which can be derived from available data. For example, the 
Transportation Research Board studied the uses of social media in public 
transportation.72 The Board’s findings synthesized the successful uses of social media to 
reach transit customers, explored how interaction with social media affected customers’ 
transportation mode choices, and identified gaps and vulnerabilities in social media 
transportation apps. Similar research can help define the interaction of SMSN and 
transportation behavior, or vice-versa, and thus establish the relationship between SMSN 
and the surface transportation system. 
This thesis hypothesizes that SMSN influence transportation behavior, and 
therefore create potential exploitable vulnerabilities in the transportation system. 
Confirming the relationship between transportation and SMSN may reveal commuters’ 
growing dependence on these platforms and the implicit trust given to its users, who 
contribute and disseminate the information. The dependence and trust developed between 
                                                 
71  Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Relationship,” accessed November 4, 2015, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/relationship. 
72 Transit Cooperative Research Program, Use of Social Media in Public Transportation—A Synthesis 
of Transit Practice (Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2012), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/
onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_syn_99.pdf. 
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the application providers, users, and contributors increases the impact a malign actor can 
have by exploiting the transportation system’s vulnerabilities. 
B. VULNERABILITY CRITERIA 
Having established the relationship between social media applications, social 
networks, and the surface transportation system, the vulnerability criteria must next be 
defined. In the context of this thesis, vulnerabilities are defined as the weak points in 
surface transportation security exposed—either intentionally or unintentionally—by 
SMSN. Exposure methods could include hacking, manipulating data, creating false 
information, crowdsourcing and disseminating false information, and using SMSN to 
gather intelligence for an attack. The transportation system is defined as components, in 
whole or in part, that contribute to the movement and navigation of people. These 
components consist of:  
• transportation infrastructure such as bridges, highways, streets, control 
systems, and intelligent transportation systems73 
• social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Nextdoor  
• social navigation sites such as Waze, Twittraffic, and Beat the Traffic 
• mapping applications such as OpenStreetMap, MapQuest, and Google 
Maps  
The Black Lives Matter protest on I-93 in Boston on January 15, 2015, 
exemplified the use of social media to organize a protest, but also exploited a 
vulnerability in Boston’s transportation system. Using Facebook and Twitter, protestors 
organized a human barricade across I-93 that stopped traffic on one of the busiest 
highways in the Boston area.74 Commuters were at a halt for four and a half hours.75 
Construction on I-93 and the Tip O’Neill Tunnel through Boston effectively removed 
surface streets. When the tunnel is congested, there are no other alternatives for motorists. 
                                                 
73 Intelligent Transportation Systems are a collection of communication and traffic technologies that 
collect, disseminate and analyze information to improve efficiency, safety and smarter use of 
transportation. 
74 Peter Schworn, Laura Crimaldi, and John R. Ellement, “Protestors Snarl Morning Commute on I-92 
near Boston,” Boston Globe, January 15, 2015, https://www.bostonglobe.com. 
75 Ibid. 
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The protests virtually turned I-93 into a parking lot. Hypothetically, if a malicious actor 
had followed these events, they would have quickly realized the opportunity for an 
attack. This is one example of exposing weak points in the surface transportation system 
that could create a security risk. This thesis aims to uncover similar vulnerabilities and 
threats in the transportation system.  
C. CATEGORIZATION 
After the vulnerability criteria are defined, the next step is to categorize the 
threats. In doing so, this thesis includes the following: 
• An examination of existing and known vulnerabilities that malign use of 
SMSN impose on the transportation system. This examination identifies 
how SMSN was used in past successful attacks, hacks, and disruptions to 
transportation systems. It also identifies thwarted attacks, hacks, and 
disruptions.  
• An exploration of malign use of SMSN tools and tactics that have not yet 
been attempted. These potential threats are largely based on SMSN 
vulnerabilities uncovered in the research that could potentially disrupt 
surface transportation systems. 
• Identification of standard hacks of websites, mobile applications, and 
mobile communications to determine vulnerable SMSN platforms. 
Documenting these attacks may show that hackers’ basic tools and 
techniques are transferrable to SMSN platforms, enabling them to further 
exploit vulnerabilities in the surface transportation system. 
• An investigation of general SMSN vulnerabilities to public safety, 
exploring hypothetical scenarios involving surface transportation security. 
This research does not include a traditional vulnerability analysis. Before this type 
of analysis can be conducted, research must first explore, define, and understand the 
vulnerabilities. As a first step, a qualitative vulnerability analysis can provide insight into 
understanding how SMSN users purposely or mistakenly create vulnerabilities in the 
surface transportation system. A traditional vulnerability analysis, in which the 
vulnerabilities are rated in relation to severity and creation of security measures, could 
potentially be performed in later research once SMSN vulnerabilities to the surface 
transportation system have been identified.  
 22 
Emerging trends in SMSN that could represent potential future vulnerabilities in 
the surface transportation system are beyond the scope of this research. 
D. ANALYSIS 
The threat categorization aims to provide a basic list and understanding of SMSN 
vulnerabilities. The categorization may also uncover trends relating to techniques, typical 
weak points, similarities between SMSN platforms with social media sites, and public use 
that make these systems vulnerable to malign exploitation. Lastly, the analysis makes 
projections about malicious or terrorist acts that could result from SMSN vulnerabilities. 
This discovery can enhance awareness of the potential devastation SMSN vulnerabilities 
and threats pose to the surface transportation system. 
E. SOURCES 
Primarily, this research reviews academic papers and journal articles, news 
articles, books, white papers, and websites. Additional data is gathered from technology-
based conferences such as those held by BlackHat and Infiltrate.  
Open-source information from popular social media and social navigation sites 
such as Twitter, Nextdoor, Waze, Inrix, and Twittraffic provide information that can be 
analyzed to determine how bad actors could exploit vulnerabilities in the transportation 
system. Investigating message boards and fora can also provide valuable information 
regarding vulnerabilities and user intent. Available metadata from these apps/websites 
may yield additional information regarding SMSN vulnerability and use. 
F. OUTCOME 
This research results in a catalog of malign SMSN tools, tactics, and techniques 
that pose security risks to surface transportation. It is hoped that this analysis may lead to 
a heuristic inquiry that could expose malign activities before they present a threat to the 
surface transportation system. This thesis provides homeland security professionals, 
cyber-security managers, city planners, and engineers a foundation upon which to 
anticipate and neutralize SMSN vulnerabilities to the transportation system. 
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IV. FINDINGS
This chapter discusses key relationships among the data that provide context for 
the research findings. First, the relationship between SMSN and surface transportation is 
established. Next, the chapter briefly describes how Web 2.0 platforms such as Waze, 
Google Maps, and Twitter work. Finally, a description of how terrorists use social media 
today is provided. 
A. SMSN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH TRANSPORTATION 
The evolution of the World Wide Web has enabled great innovation and 
collaboration among internet users. The rise of social media is considered Web 2.0’s 
most defining characteristic.76 Generally, social media is defined as “the collective of 
online communications channels dedicated to community-based input, interaction, 
content sharing and collaboration.”77 Popular social media sites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and Google+ are examples of these online communications platforms. Many 
social media sites are designed for specific purposes or specific audiences. For example, 
LinkedIn is designed to engage and build a social network centered on business 
professionals; LinkedIn facilitates professional networking, allowing users to list work 
history and professional accomplishments, and to make employment connections.78 At its 
heart, Web 2.0 allows users to exchange information within virtual and physical social 
networks. Web 2.0’s strength is bringing people together, whether they are sharing 
playlists on Spotify (an online music-streaming service) or answering questions on Quora 
(a question-answer site, regulated by users). 
Surface transportation has also been affected by the World Wide Web and social 
networking. For example, Facebook contains several social networking groups focused 
on driving safety. To understand these groups’ influence on Facebook, researchers Emma 
76 WhatIs, s.v. “Web 2.0,” accessed June 16, 2016, http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Web-20-or-
Web-2. 
77 WhatIs, s.v. “Social Media,” WhatIs, accessed June 16, 2016, http://whatis.techtarget.com/
definition/social-media. 
78 Wikipedia, s.v. “Linkdedin,” accessed June 16, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LinkedIn. 
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Apatu, Melissa Alperin, Kathleen Miner, and David Wiljer sought to measure its 
effectiveness. Their research discovered that social networking has been an effective tool 
in promoting safe driver behavior. “In all,” they found, “62% of respondents <24 years 
and 57.8% of respondents aged >25 years reported changing their driving-related 
behaviors as a result of reading information on the [driving safety Facebook groups] to 
which they belong.”79 Some researchers argue that this type of descriptive data (or 
sentiment) is more useful to motorists than traditional data collection techniques such as 
inductive loops or video detection.80 While traditional data simply relays facts and 
numbers, sentiment often conveys an emotional state or a perception about a situation, 
person, or group, which helps traffic engineers better understand the human effects of 
driving.81 
Twitter, the micro-blogging social media site, has become a sounding board for 
users to express their frustration with others’ driving behavior, or a means to warn others 
about traffic conditions.82 The use of Twitter to express traffic and transportation 
sentiment has become so prevalent that researchers have begun to correlate tweets with 
mobility patterns in an effort to understand a particular area’s overall traffic 
background.83 In some cases, Twitter users have become social sensors for traffic 
conditions; programs designed to provide directions based on geolocation can now alter 
directions based on Twitter input.84  
79 Emma Apatu et al., “A Drive through Web 2.0—An Exploration of Driving Safety Promotion on 
Facebook,” Health Promotion Practice 14, no. 1 (January 2013): 93. 
80 Panraphee Raphiphan, Arkady Zaslasky, and Maria Indrawan-Santiago, “Building Knowledge from 
Social Networks on What Is Important to Drivers in Constrained Road Infrastructure,” paper presented at 
the 18th International Conference on Knowledge Based and Intelligent Information & Engineering Systems, 
Gydnia, Poland, 2014, 728. 
81 Stefan Stieglitz and Linh Dang-Xuan, “Emotions and Information Diffusion in Social-Media—
Sentiment of Microblogs and Sharing Behavior,” Journal of Management Information Systems 29, no. 4, 
(April 2013): 218. 
82 Theodore Georgiou et al., Mining Complaints for Traffic Jam Estimation: A Social 
Sensor Application (Santa Barbara: University of California Santa Barbara, 2015): 1. 
83 Francisco Rebelo, Carlos Soares, and Rosaldo Resetti, “TwitterJam: Identification of Mobility 
Patterns in Urban Centers based on Tweets,” paper presented at the 2015 IEEE First International Smart 
Cities Conference (ISC2), Guadalajara, Mexico, October 25–28. 
84 Silvio Ribeiro et al., “Traffic Observatory: A System to Detect and Locate Traffic Events and 
Conditions Using Twitter,” paper presented at the 5th ACM Sigspatial International Workshop on 
Location Based Networks, Redondo Beach, CA, November 6, 2012. 
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Transportation agencies have noticed the power of social media and have started 
using various social media platforms to reach motorists. Table 1 shows an example of 
some California transportation agencies that use social media. 
Table 1.   Social Media Use by California Transportation Agencies 
Agency Social Media Platforms 
California Department of Transportation 
(CalTrans) 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Google+, 
Waze 
City of Los Angeles Department of 
Transportation (LADot) Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, 
San Francisco Municipal Transportation 
Agency (SFMTA) Twitter, Facebook, YouTube 
City of San Jose Department of 
Transportation Twitter, Facebook 
Social media is a valuable tool for these agencies because it helps them “understand the 
needs, behaviors and preferences of people to improve and support transportation-related 
decisions during emergency and non-emergency situations.”85 Social media can also help 
transportation agencies distribute information regarding upcoming transportation-related 
construction work or sudden traffic delays in an effort to reduce traffic congestion.  
In April 2016, the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) announced 
a partnership with Waze that will allow both parties to exchange real-time traffic 
information. Waze will provide CalTrans with real-time traffic data from its users 
(anonymous data), which will be posted on CalTrans’ traffic maps. In turn, CalTrans will 
provide Waze with road construction work notices and other traffic information that 
could contribute to congestion.86 This effort aims to empower motorists with the 
information needed to make effective driving decisions when traveling or commuting 
85 Aybek Kocetepe et al., “The Reach and Influence of DOT Twitter Accounts: A Case Study in 
Florida,” paper presented at the 18th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 
Canary Islands, Spain, September 15–18, 2015. 
86 “Caltrans Partners with Waze Connected Citizens Program,” California Department of 
Transportation, April 5, 2016, http://www.dot.ca.gov/paffairs/pr/2016/prs/16pr033.html. 
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throughout California. This partnership exemplifies the expanding relationship between 
transportation and social media and the power of information sharing. 
B. GOOGLE MAPS, WAZE, AND TWITTER 
This section provides a brief description of Google Maps, Waze, and Twitter as 
they are used for transportation information. A basic understanding of these platforms 
also provides insight into how they can be used for malicious purposes. 
1. Google Maps and Google Earth 
Google Maps, first launched in 2005, offers “satellite imagery street maps, 360° 
panoramic views of streets, real-time traffic conditions and route planning for traveling 
by foot, car, bicycle or public transportation.”87 Figure 1 shows the typical directions 
function on the Google Maps website.  
 
Figure 1.  Google Maps88 
                                                 
87 Wikipedia, s.v. “Google Maps,” accessed June 14, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Google_Maps. 
88 Drew Olanoff, “Deep Dive with the New Google Maps for Desktop with Google Earth Integration, 
It’s More than Just a Utility,” Tech Crunch, May 15, 2013, https://techcrunch.com/2013/05/15/deep-dive-
with-the-new-google-maps-for-desktop-with-google-earth-integration-its-more-than-just-a-utility/. 
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In 2008, Google developed Google Maps for the mobile device, which provides motorists 
turn-by-turn driving directions.89 To obtain real-time traffic information for the app, 
Google uses signals from cellphones to create a traffic conditions map.90 A cellphone 
registers its location each time it passes by a cellphone receiving tower; the Google Maps 
algorithm is able to use this data to determine a traveling vehicle’s speed. It can also 
compare data from other cellphone signals, which ultimately creates the background 
conditions for a traffic congestion map. Google further leverages its millions of users 
through a program called MapMaker to develop additional mapping information—this 
program is used in areas where accurate mapping data is not available and local 
knowledge is needed.91  
Google Maps is accessible via the internet; another Google product with similar 
mapping and geographic capabilities, Google Earth, is only accessible as a standalone 
application that must be downloaded to a computer or mobile device.92 Google Earth 
combines satellite imagery, aerial photography, and geographical information systems 
and superimposes this information on a three-dimensional earth.93 One advantage of 
Google Earth over Google Maps is the “street view” feature. Street view “provides 360° 
panoramic street-level views and allows users to view parts of selected cities and their 
surrounding metropolitan areas at ground level.”94 This feature visually familiarizes the 
user exploring new destinations and areas. Other key features of Google Earth that 
provide advantages over Google Maps are the “birds-eye view” and “3D” capabilities.95 
These features provide additional points of view and data sets for the user to exploit. 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 Greg Miller, “The Huge, Unseen Operation behind the Accuracy and Operation of Google Maps,” 
Wired, December 8, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/12/google-maps-ground-truth/. 
91 Ibid. 






2. Waze  
Purchased by Google in 2013, Waze is a traffic and geographical navigation 
application that provides turn-by-turn navigation, travel times, and route details to its 
users (see Figure 2).96 When the app is activated, Waze passively collects and processes 
GPS information from user cell phone transmissions to yield speed, direction, and 
location information.97 Waze had an estimated 50 million users at the time of Google’s 
purchase.98 
 
Figure 2.  Waze99 
  
                                                 
96 Wikipedia, s.v.”Waze,” accessed June 14, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Waze. 
97 Talia Dror, Sagi Dalyot, and Yerach Doysther, “A Quantitative Geo-Evaluation of Crowdsourcing 
and Wisdom of the Crowd,” International Federation of Surveyors, December 2014, 6, http://www.fig.net/
resources/monthly_articles/2014/december_2014/december_2014.pdf. 
98 Josef Federman and Max J. Rosenthal, “Waze Sale Signals New Growth for Israeli High Tech,” 
Yahoo, June 12, 2013, https://www.yahoo.com/news/waze-sale-signals-growth-israeli-high-tech-
174533585.html?ref=gs. 
99 Perez, “Navigation App Waze.” 
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What differentiates Waze from other traffic navigation applications, however, is 
the additional focus on gathering and disseminating traffic information from its users. 
Waze users, or “Wazers,” are able to contribute and post traffic information such as 
destinations, traffic congestion, accidents, road closures, and available routes based on 
real-time observations. This “wisdom of the crowd” is used to help solve daily 
commuting and vehicle travel issues. As users drive and post traffic information, they 
accrue credibility points. As points accumulate, users are assigned ranks ranging from 
“Waze Baby” to “Waze Royalty.”100 “Waze Champs” are higher-level Waze users and 
editors with seniority who are active in fora and the Waze wiki.101 Waze Champs 
ultimately approve editing of maps and help Waze ensure information is as accurate as 
possible. The point system and user level recognition function as incentives for Wazers to 
keep using the app, and as a way to provide information checks and balances, allowing 
users to trust the information. 
3. Twitter
Twitter is a micro-blogging SMSN platform. Each micro-blog post consists of 
140 characters, which are called tweets.102 A Twitter user establishes their network by 
“following” other users. All users on Twitter can view all tweets, unless access is 
restricted to those within one’s network. Twitter users typically “share their thoughts, 
news, and information.”103 Messages on Twitter can also be “re-tweeted” (re-posted) by 
other users to spread the message among the network.104 To denote key words or topics, 
a hashtag (#) is placed before the word or topic.105 The hashtag helps categorize content 
100 “Your Rank and Points,” Wiki Waze, accessed June 14, 2016, https://wiki.waze.com/wiki/
Your_Rank_and_Points#Waze_Points_Level_.28in_client_app.29. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Wikipedia, s.v. “Twitter,” accessed June 14, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter. 
103 Brandon Smith, “The Beginner’s Guide to Twitter,” Mashable, June 5, 2012, http://mashable.com/
2012/06/05/twitter-for-beginners/#QsuAfs2B5Eq7. 
104 Chris Syme, “Why Do You Retweet?” Social Media Today, July 23, 2010, 
http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/why-do-you-retweet. 
105 Rebecca Hiscott, “The Beginner’s Guide to Hashtag,” Mashable, October 8, 2013, 
http://mashable.com/2013/10/08/what-is-hashtag/#FgiK4gv7euqL. 
 30 
and ensure that it is searchable.106 Twitter can be accessed through the internet, as well as 
through mobile applications for tablets and smartphones. Twitter’s basic technological 
framework relies on available open-source software for web-application interface setup, 
message handling, and delivery.107 Twitter also allows geotagging (geographically 
locating a tweet).108 As of March 2016, Twitter had over an estimated 310 million active 
users.109 
One of Twitter’s most common uses is to crowdsource information and opinions. 
For example, during and after Hurricane Sandy, Twitter was widely used by “individuals, 
first responder agencies and utility companies to relay messages and information, share 
evacuation orders and provide updates on the storm.”110 The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) used Twitter during Hurricane Sandy for situational 
awareness, utilizing trending topics to produce safety information.111 Government 
agencies at the state level also use Twitter to inform their networks about road conditions 
and construction (see Figure 3). 




109 Wikipedia, s.v. “Twitter,” accessed June 14, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter. 
110 Sean Estes Cohen, “Sandy Marked a Shift for Social Media Use in Disasters,” Emergency 




Figure 3.  Tweet from the Texas Department of Transportation112 
Waze has also partnered with Twitter to distribute traffic-related information through the 
Twitter platform. In terms of traffic and transportation, numerous studies have been 
performed to analyze traffic sentiment and traffic conditions based on tweets.113  
Platforms such as Google Maps, Waze, and Twitter leverage their many users to 
crowdsource traffic- and transportation-related information in order to enhance and 
improve traffic operations. Unfortunately, despite their benefits, no social media platform 
is immune to malicious acts or activity.  
C. TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
A simple Google search of “terrorist use of social media” yields 19,200,000 
results. While not every result is a unique example of social media exploitation by 
terrorists, the sheer number of results illustrates the amount of analysis and discussion on 
this topic. 
112 “1 Dead, Several Injured after Major Bridge Accident; Traffic Rerouted all along I-35 North of 
Austin,” Texas Public Radio, March 26, 2015, http://tpr.org/post/1-dead-several-injured-after-major-
bridge-accident-traffic-rerouted-all-along-i-35-north-austin#stream/0. 
113 For example, see Antonio Candelieri and Francesco Archeti, “Detecting Events and Sentiment on 
Twitter for Improving Urban Mobility,” paper presented at ESSEM 2015, Istanbul, May 5, 2015. 
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Social media is easy to use, inexpensive, and widely accessible. These 
characteristics make it attractive to both the mainstream public and malicious actors. 
Social media can be a tool that helps terrorists further their goals, whatever they may be. 
The three most common uses of social media by terrorists and radicalized movements 
include communication, development and distribution of terrorist propaganda, and the 
recruitment of new members.114 ISIS, for example, has developed sophisticated social 
media skills, proving “fluent in YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, Tumblr, internet memes 
and other social media.”115 ISIS is successful because they use social media to bring their 
malicious message to the world’s front door.116 Savvy social media use “increases the 
number of people learning about your cause, [spreads] the word, and supports your 
organization,” which is exactly how ISIS conducts their social media activities.117 ISIS 
has exploited these social media platforms by displaying video beheadings, posting 
messages for a call to arms to wage jihad in the West, and conducting secret 
communications on encrypted messaging services, which conveys the communication, 
propaganda, and recruitment objectives they pursue (see Figure 4).118 
                                                 
114 “The Role of Technology in Modern Terrorism,” INFOSEC Institute, February 3, 2016, 
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/the-role-of-technology-in-modern-terrorism/. 
115 “How Terrorists Are Using Social Media,” Telegraph, November 4, 2014, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11207681/How-terrorists-are-using-social-
media.html. 
116 Wu, “Impossible to Regulate,” 289. 
117 “Social Media on Purpose 2014—Using Social Media Strategically to Advance Your Mission,” 
Stanford Social Innovation Review, accessed May 22, 2014, http://ssir.org/socialmediaonpurpose. 
118 Brenden K. Koerner, “Why ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War,” Wired, April 2016, 
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/isis-winning-social-media-war-heres-beat/. 
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Figure 4.  Example of ISIS’ Social Media Use119 
ISIS and other terrorist groups can also use social media for fundraising and 
intelligence gathering, and to conduct cyberattacks and distribute training materials.120 
The continued exposure and exploitation of vulnerabilities in social media—and now 
social navigation—is a major concern for homeland security professionals, including 
those charged with securing the surface transportation system.  
D. TYPES OF THREATS/ATTACKS BASED ON VULNERABILITY 
Data on SMSN vulnerabilities in the surface transportation system were derived 
from a review of existing academic papers, journal articles, news articles, books, white 
papers, and websites. Table 2 lists vulnerabilities already discovered by researchers or 
already exploited by terrorists. The vulnerabilities are grouped into three categories: 
SMSN manipulation, social navigation manipulation, and use of SMSN for intelligence. 
119 Chris Good, Joshua Cohan, and Lee Ferran, “ ‘Cybervandalism’: ISIS Supporters Hijack U.S. 
Military Social Media Accounts,” ABC News, January 12, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/International/us-
military-twitter-account-apparently-hijacked-isis-supporters/story?id=28170963. 
120 “The Role of Technology in Modern Terrorism,” INFOSEC Institute. 
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Use of SMSN for 
Intelligence 
Researchers Generated false information/events on Waze   x   
Researchers Attack on real-time trip routing function on Waze   x   
Researchers Large-scale attack via virtual vehicles or “ghost riders” on Waze   x   
Researchers Generation of false information or events on Google Maps   x   
Terrorists Use of Google Earth/Maps for intelligence     x 
Terrorists Use of Google Earth for intelligence     x 
Hackers Hacking/spamming of Google Maps with false information   x   
Researchers Generation of false information/events on Waze   x   
Researchers Attack on real-time trip routing function on Waze   x   
Researchers GPS spoofing on Waze   x   
Researchers Use of man-in-the-middle and Sybil attack to influence traffic routing on Waze   x   
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One definition of manipulation is “the action of influencing or controlling 
something to your advantage, often without anyone knowing it.”129 Social media are 
freely available, and their users generate content ranging from pictures and videos, to 
web posts and text.130 Manipulating social media or social navigation platforms thus 
involves using or influencing that content to one’s advantage. In the same vein, 
intelligence can be defined as “the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills.”131 
For the purposes of this thesis, intelligence is the information acquired and disseminated 
on SMSN platforms for the application of malign intent, to include the identification of 
potential attack targets and use in the planning and execution process. 
Table 3 lists potential vulnerabilities based on past manipulation and/or 
intelligence-gathering use of social media. The last two entries in Table 3 reflect 
vulnerabilities in the rapidly evolving autonomous-vehicle market. The vulnerabilities are 
illustrated by scenarios and grouped into four categories: SMSN manipulation, social 
navigation manipulation, use of open-source SMSN for intelligence, and social media to 
control narrative and information. 
129 Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “Manipulation,” accessed July 5, 2016, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/manipulation. 
130 Freeman and Schroeder, Social Media Exploitation, 10. 
131 Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “Intelligence,” accessed July 13, 2016, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/intelligence. 
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Use of geosocial networks to improve traffic 
safety—conversely, potential use by terrorists for 
intelligence   
x  
Researchers Use of social media platforms such as Waze to improve driving conditions  x x  
Researchers Use of social media platforms such as Twitter to distribute and review information   x x 
Terrorists Hacking of state and local social media accounts x x  x 
Researchers Use of cloning attack to generate false events or attack real-time routing function  x   
Researchers Use of Sybil attacks in Vehicle Area Networks (VANETS) and on-board social networks  x   
Researchers Use of cyberattacks on connected vehicles and on-board social networks  x   
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The information in Tables 2 and 3 fit within the framework of the vulnerability 
criteria described in Chapter III. Chapter V provides a more detailed illustration of how 
malicious actors could exploit these vulnerabilities to put the surface transportation 
system at risk. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Prior to evaluating the data from Chapter IV, it is necessary to better understand 
the potential value SMSN tools represent for terrorists. 
A. THE VALUE OF SMSN TOOLS FOR TERRORISTS 
“Terrorists use social media for many of the same reasons that anyone else does. 
It is user friendly, reliable and free.”132 Social media can easily provide information to 
terrorists who are planning an attack, whether it be intelligence on specific targets, 
optimal times of day for an attack, or an estimated number of potential casualties. 
Similarly, social navigation and mapping technology can provide terrorists with 
information about potential targets, ingress/egress routes, and potential infrastructure 
damage and disruption. 
The 2008 attacks in Mumbai by the jihadist group Lashkar-e-Taiba exemplify 
how terrorists can leverage social media to conduct their operations. During the attacks, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba monitored Twitter to enhance their situational awareness; they were able 
to evaluate how their attack was unfolding in the eyes of their victims, and identify 
potential law enforcement operations.133 This information allowed the group to evade 
authorities and continue their terror operations. Lashkar-e-Taiba also leveraged social 
navigation and mapping technology (such as Google Maps and Google Earth) to identify 
attack targets and route planning.134 
Malicious actors can also monitor social media to ensure their attacks coincide 
with known and planned gatherings, increasing potential lethality. For example, during 
the Ferguson, Missouri Protests in 2015, “Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr [were used] to 
132 Wu, “Impossible to Regulate,” 288. 
133 Oh, “Information control and terrorism,” 33 
134 Matteo Cavalini and John Austen, Terrorist Use of the internet (Egham, UK: Royal Holloway, 
2014), 3. 
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spread the word about planned protest locations.”135 In a hypothetical scenario, malicious 
actors could have monitored Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to identify protest locations 
as potential attack targets. Further, Google Maps could be used to exploit vulnerabilities 
in the transportation system to enhance an attack. 
On a macroscopic level, SMSN gives malicious actors access to a captive 
audience with a “follow-the-crowd” mentality.136 Malicious actors may influence this 
audience by injecting misleading information or manipulating data to control their 
behavior for an eventual attack on the transportation system. This, however, requires 
skills in manipulating social media. The following section describes the sophistication 
malicious actors need in order to exploit SMSN. 
B. ANALYSIS 
To reiterate, the research question posed in this thesis is, “What threats do SMSN 
pose to the surface transportation system?” As described in the literature review, research 
is needed (and is ongoing) to specifically identify the threats and vulnerabilities SMSN 
pose for surface transportation systems.  
1. Social Media 
There is no conclusive evidence suggesting that social media pose a direct threat 
to surface transportation systems. However, social media’s potential for exploitation is 
implied by its pervasive use among terrorist groups and individuals. The most concerning 
exploitation of social media comes in two forms: disseminating false information to 
control the narrative or behavior of social groups, and using legitimate information as a 
source of intelligence. 
                                                 
135 Rubina Madan Fillion, “How Ferguson Protestors Used Social Media to Organize,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 24, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2014/11/24/how-ferguson-protesters-use-
social-media-to-organize/. 
136 Amble, “Combating Terrorism,” 340–341. 
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a. Disseminating False Information
Many government transportation agencies maintain social media accounts on 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Nextdoor to disseminate traffic-related 
information. In doing so, they provide their followers information that informs traveling 
and commuting decisions. They are also able to directly suggest traveling and commuting 
actions. Terrorists have the ability to hack into social media accounts and have been 
known to do so to control the political and terror message.137 In a hypothetical scenario, 
terrorists could hack into one or several transportation agencies’ social media accounts to 
distribute false information and to influence traffic routing to set up an attack. 
Alternatively, terrorist or malicious actors, as “followers” of a transportation agency’s 
social media account, can suggest traffic routing based on false traffic events. In either 
scenario, terror operations could be conducted using vehicle-born explosives or pre-
staged explosives along congested traffic routes recommended through social media.  
How feasible is this scenario? Although a detailed assessment of specific threats 
is out of the scope of this thesis, this research does seek to identify potential exploitable 
vulnerabilities. That being said, homeland security professionals and emergency 
responders are constantly evaluating social media information for legitimacy prior to 
acting on such information. Social media has been an asset for disaster response, but it 
has been a challenge for homeland security professionals to discern creditable, actionable 
information.138 While not associated with SMSN transportation systems, the social media 
postings of the San Bernardino Terrorists (Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik) and the 
Orlando Terrorist (Omar Mateen) relating to their ties to terrorist groups illustrate that 
social media information is difficult to substantiate, thus limiting the chances for a 
successful investigation leading to an arrest.139  
137 Seth Rosenblatt, “US Military Social Media Accounts Hacked,” CNET, January 12, 2015, 
http://www.cnet.com/news/us-military-social-media-accounts-hit-with-hacking-attack/. 
138 Seth Thomas, “Social Media Changing the Way FEMA Responds to Disasters, National Defense, 
September 2013, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/September/Pages/
SocialMediaChangingtheWayFEMARespondstoDisasters.aspx; Lindsay, “Social Media and Disasters,” 6. 




b. Using Legitimate Information as Intelligence 
Social media platforms provide a forum for users to update explicit and implicit 
information to and about their social networks.140 Twitter, for example, allows speedy 
and concise messages that can propagate beyond one’s network through re-tweeting, 
ultimately becoming a source of traceable information.141 During natural disasters, 
Twitter has been used to provide situational awareness of the affected area. Emergency 
responders can track Twitter trends and make decisions about rescue efforts.142  
Twitter is also commonly used to express sentiment regarding traffic conditions. 
Researchers have developed an algorithm to extract traffic-related tweets as a tool to 
monitor traffic conditions, and have created software that visually maps these tweets to 
better understand the performance of the surface transportation system.143 This analysis 
of traffic-related tweets is a form of intelligence gathering, which researchers hope will 
be used to improve the flow of vehicle traffic. Malicious actors can likewise exploit this 
information as tactical knowledge to attack the surface transportation system.  
As previously mentioned, Lashkar-e-Taiba used Twitter to gather situational 
awareness during their 2008 attacks in Mumbai. A malicious group could similarly track 
traffic-related tweets to determine and target vulnerable locations within the surface 
transportation system. Public transportation has been a popular target for terrorists, and 
tweets regarding service disruptions or delays in transit could be evaluated for an 
                                                 
140 Davide Frey, Arnaud J´egou, and Anne-Marie Kermarrec, “Social Market: Combining Explicit and 
Implicit Social Networks,” paper presented at the International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and 
Security of Distributed Systems, Grenoble, France, October 2011, 1–2. 
141 Jayson DeMers, “Twitter vs. Facebook: How Do the They Compare?” Huffington Post, September 
5, 2013,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jayson-demers/twitter-vs-facebook_b_3869786.html. 
142 Alisa Kongthon et al., “The Role of Twitter during a Natural Disaster: A Case Study of the 2011 
Thai Food,” paper presented at PICMET ‘12: Technology Management for Emerging Technologies, 
Vancouver, British Columbia, July 29–August 2, 2012), 2231. 
143 Kaiquan Fu, Chang-tien Lu, Rakesh Nune, and Jason Tao, “Steds: Social Media based 
Transportation Event Detection with Text Summarization,” paper presented at the 2015 IEEE 18th 
International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems, Canary Islands, Spain, September 15–18, 
2015, 1952; Rebelo, Soares, and Resetti, “TwitterJam,” 2–3. 
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attack.144 Delays or service disruptions leave many riders stranded at public transit 
stations that are in turn vulnerable to an attack. For example, a simple search of the 
#BARTstrike hashtag (see Figures 5 and 6) could provide enough information for a 
malicious group to determine if an attack on the San Francisco Municipal Railway or 
Caltrain transportation systems is feasible and substantial. Open-source information is 
freely available on social media; with sufficient planning and intent, terrorists could use 
this information to plot an attack. 
Figure 5.  #BARTstrike Tweet with Time and Location Tags145 
144 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Troubling Trends in Terrorism and Attacks on 
Surface Transportation: The Outlook is Grim, but People Still Have a Great Deal of Control (San Jose, 
CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2015), 2. 




Figure 6.  #BARTstrike Tweet with Population Information146 
2. Social Navigation Manipulation 
Ongoing research is investigating vulnerabilities in Waze and Google Maps that 
could leave the apps open to exploitation by terrorists or other malign actors.147 Sybil 
attacks are a primary focus of this research. A Sybil attack is a type of hacking on  
Web 2.0 platforms in which a malicious actor creates multiple false identities to hijack 
and control a system or to influence a reputation system.148 Figure 7 shows a simple 
graphical representation of a Sybil attack. 
                                                 
146 Ibid. 
147 Gang Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices in Crowdsourced Mapping Services,” paper 
presented at MobiSys ‘16, Singapore, June 25–30, 2016; Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation; 
Tobias Jeske, “Floating Car Data from Smartphones—What Google and Waze Know about You and How 
Hackers Can Control Traffic,” paper presented at Black Hat Europe, Amsterdam, March 12–15, 2013. 
148 Alexander Howard, “What is a Sybil Attack,” TopTen Reviews, August 2, 2011, http://anti-virus-
software-review.toptenreviews.com/what-is-a-sybil-attack-.html. 
45 
Figure 7.  Sybil Attack149 
Several groups of researchers have conducted Sybil attacks in two ways. First, 
one group implemented an operating system emulator on a computer and used script 
software to generate false user accounts in Waze.150 A second method conducted a man-
in-the-middle attacks, which was used to intercept wireless communications traffic 
between the mobile device and the application server. This was performed both on Waze 
and Google Maps (see Figures 8 and 9).151 Either method of Sybil attack could arm a 
malicious actor with multiple imposter identities.152  
149 Ladislav Beranek, “JOnline: Auditing Electronic Auction Systems,” ISACA, accessed August 14, 
2016, http://www.isaca.org/Journal/archives/2010/Volume-4/Pages/JOnline-Auditing-Electronic-Auction-
Systems.aspx. 
150 Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices,” 3; Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation, 
5; Jeske, “Floating Car Data from Smartphones,” 2. 
151 Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices,” 4; Jeske, “Floating Car Data from Smartphones,” 
2. 
152 It should be noted that Wang et al. received Institutional Review Board permission to conduct 
Sybil attack experiments in locations with low population densities and where low traffic volumes were 
expected; they were instructed to terminate the experiment should actual Waze users be affected. Sinai et 
al. conducted their experiment in Haifa, Israel; to ensure safety of actual Waze users, they avoided major 
roads and highways. Jeske conducted his experiment on roads in Hamburg-Bahrenfeld, Germany; it is not 
known how Jeske ensured motorist safety during his experiment. See Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil 
Devices,” 2–3; Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation, 5; Jeske, “Floating Car Data from 
Smartphones,” 8.  
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Figure 8.  Example Software Script on an Operating System Emulator153 
 
 
Figure 9.  Main-in-the-Middle Attack154 
Waze and Google Maps depend on crowdsourced information automatically 
drawn from mobile devices or directly input by users. Algorithms then use this 
information to determine surface transportation choices for the user based on starting and 
                                                 
153 Max Saperstone, “Using Genymotion to Simulate a Moving Device,” coveros, November 10, 
2015, https://www.coveros.com/using-genymotion-to-simulate-a-moving-device/. 
154 “What Is Man-in-the-Middle and How to Protect Your Data and Mobile Apps from Such Attacks,” 
TeskaLabs, accessed August 14, 2016, https://www.teskalabs.com/blog/protect-mobile-app-and-prevent-
man-in-the-middle-attack. 
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destination locations. A Sybil attack exploits trust vulnerabilities in web and mobile 
application platforms by disregarding the terms of use agreements (which preclude the 
deliberate introduction of false information) and using imposter identities.155 These 
imposter identities can present false or alternative information that incorrectly guide users 
in a manner desired by the malicious actor. Thousands of false identities can also be 
programmed to operate in a particular manner such that users are misled to “follow the 
crowd.”  
a. Waze
In Waze, imposter identities can affect surface traffic behavior in four ways: 
1. An imposter identity can plant false traffic data points such as accidents,
road closures, hazards, police locations, and traffic congestion.156
2. Numerous imposter identities can be programmed to drive slowly or
quickly along a particular route and create traffic congestion, as long as
the number of imposter vehicles outnumbers actual vehicles.157
3. A malicious actor can program thousands of imposter identities, or “ghost
riders,” to travel at various speeds to trigger traffic congestion and
promote alternate routes on Waze.158
4. Imposter vehicles can use mock GPS coordinates to travel along a certain
trajectory at programmed speed intervals, thus creating traffic congestion
and promoting alternate routes.159
In the research cited, methods two through four caused Waze to display traffic 
congestion. Waze will suggest alternate travel routes should the targeted route have a 
comparably longer travel time.160 Method one, in and of itself, does not affect traffic 
routing; it may, however, potentially influence an actual motorist to take alternate 
155 “Terms of Use,” Waze; “Google Maps/Google Earth Additional Terms of Service,” Google. 
156 Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices,” 3. 
157 Ibid., 4. 
158 Ibid., 5. 
159 Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation, 5. 
160 Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices,” 4. 
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routes.161 Figures 10 through 12 display the various Sybil attacks and the Waze app’s 
resulting reactions. Figure 10 shows placement of false police locations by the student 
researchers at Technion. There was no conclusive evidence that Waze would have 
displayed an alternate route; ultimately, Waze users themselves must make the 
determination to use alternate routes.  
 
Figure 10.  False Waze Locations162 
Figure 11 shows the student researchers’ false traffic congestion created by Sybil 
identities. Waze reacted by displaying an alternate route. 
 
                                                 
161 Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation, 4. 
162 Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation. 
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Figure 11.  False Traffic Congestion in Waze from Technion Students’ 
Sybil Attack163 
Figure 12 shows the false traffic congestion created by the Wang et al.’s Sybil 
identities. Waze reacted by displaying an alternate route. 
Figure 12.  False Traffic Congestion in Waze from Wang et al.’s Sybil Attack164 
163 Ibid. 
164 Wang et al., “Defending against Sybil Devices.” 
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b. Google Maps 
Much like in Waze, imposter identities can negatively affect Google Maps by 
displaying false traffic congestion. In 2013, Tobias Jeske performed a man-in-the-middle 
attack on Google Maps, claiming that “attackers can anonymously manipulate the traffic 
analysis and actively influence the navigation of the software.”165 To prove his point, he 
drove a route in Hamburg, Germany and collected data packets sent to Google Maps 
from smartphones. To create traffic congestion on Google Maps, he took the intercepted 
smartphone data packets and re-sent them to the Google Maps server with modified 
indicators like time stamps, cookies, and platform keys. Figure 13 represents the Sybil 
attack via the man-in-the-middle method on a route in Hamburg, Germany. Multiple 
simulated vehicles were used to create traffic congestion on Google Maps. 
 
Figure 13.  Google Maps Man-in-the-Middle Attack166 
  
                                                 
165 Jeske, “Floating Car Data from Smartphones,” 12. 
166 Ibid. 
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3. Homeland Security Implications
The Sybil attacks on Waze and Google Maps demonstrate vulnerabilities that 
could lead to security concerns for surface transportation professionals and users. These 
vulnerabilities center on users’ expectation of the apps’ reliability and reputation. Waze is 
one of the most popular mobile navigation applications, with an estimated 50 million 
users as of 2013, the majority of whom commute in metropolitan areas.167 In the San 
Francisco Bay Area, approximately 700,000 users implicitly trust Waze to guide their 
daily commutes.168 Google Maps has a larger consumer base, with an average of one 
billion monthly users both online and through mobile applications.169 Consumers act 
upon crowdsourced information almost instantaneously; between Waze and Google 
Maps, that is a large captive audience.170 Waze and Google Maps users are also unlikely 
to back-check other traffic navigation sources—the crowdsourced information is not only 
manually input by users, but also by GPS transponders in mobile devices. Again, based 
on a sense of trust (implied by the terms of use) Waze and Google Maps users may be 
inclined to discount the possibility that information provided is false.  
These vulnerabilities can allow a malicious actor to control and corral unwitting 
Waze and Google Maps users into gridlock. A gridlocked surface transportation system 
can paralyze a city’s economy and standard of life. A paralyzed transportation system 
also presents a soft target for terrorist acts. As has been demonstrated, a malicious actor 
or group could set a “trap” by using a Sybil attack to suggest alternative routes based on 
false traffic congestion. The “trap” can be predetermined to maximize damage, both in 
human and infrastructure cost, through the use of vehicle-born explosives or suicide 
bombers.  
167 Peter Cohan, “Four Reasons Google Bought Waze,” Forbes, June 11, 2013, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2013/06/11/four-reasons-for-google-to-buy-waze/#2337dc3c1433. 
168 Jack Nicas, “Alphabet Unveils Program for Carpooling Via App Waze, Fraying Ties With Uber,” 
Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/alphabet-unveils-program-for-carpooling-
via-app-fraying-ties-with-uber-1463428668. 
169 Ludovic Privat, “Google Maps: 1 Billion Monthly Users,” GPS Business News, July 17, 2014, 
http://www.gpsbusinessnews.com/Google-Maps-1-Billion-Monthly-Users_a4964.html. 
170 Landon Cox, “Truth in Crowdsourcing,” IEEE Security and Privacy 9, no. 5, (2011): 75. 
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The surface transportation system is a soft target with high potential for large-
scale casualties.171 Buses are the preeminent soft target for terrorist attacks, followed by 
trains, light rail, and their associated stations.172 While highway infrastructure or 
passenger vehicles have not been popular terrorism targets, it seems inevitable that an 
attack will occur based on the history of terrorist attacks on public transportation—for 
instance, the 1995 Sarin Gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, the 2004 commuter rail 
bombings in Madrid, and the 2005 bombings of London buses.173 A Sybil attack on 
Waze, Google Maps, or similar apps could provide a new target vector for terrorists, 
attracting them to highway infrastructure or passenger vehicles. This would be especially 
devastating in the United States, where the motor vehicle is the predominant mode of 
travel, with tens of millions of urban commuters daily.174  
4. Social Navigation as Intelligence 
So far, there has been no evidence of malicious actors using Waze or Google 
Maps as intelligence-gathering platforms to plan or orchestrate an attack. Previously in 
this thesis, a hypothetical scenario described how legitimate information on Twitter could 
be used to collect information and intelligence with which to orchestrate an attack. Like 
Twitter, Waze and Google Maps could be used to identify attack targets or to orchestrate 
an attack based on legitimate traffic congestion or traffic routing information. 
Another Google product, however, Google Earth, has already been used by 
terrorist groups to launch attacks on British bases in Basra in 2013.175 Lashkar-e-Taiba 
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173 Wikipedia, s.v. “Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack,” accessed July 14, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Tokyo_subway_sarin_attack; Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Long-Term Trends in 
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also used Google Earth to plan the 2008 Mumbai attacks.176 While Google Earth is not a 
social navigation or traffic routing application, terrorists have demonstrated that Web 2.0 
platforms are being used for intelligence purposes by terrorist organizations. It seems 
only a matter of time before Waze and Google Maps are used for similar purposes. 
C. FUTURE CONCERNS 
Though it is difficult to quantify how often malicious actors are using SMSN 
platforms, the data in Chapter IV and the analysis in this chapter infer that SMSN 
platforms can be exploited for information that will aid terrorist attacks. This poses a 
specific threat to surface transportation. Continued use of SMSN platforms in this manner 
should be anticipated because it is freely available; because of the sheer volume of users, 
it is difficult for security services to track information, and there is enough substantial 
information in SMSN to facilitate or enhance operational attack planning and 
execution.177 This low risk of detection is perhaps the most compelling reason for 
malicious actors to continue using SMSN for intelligence gathering.178 
Sybil attacks have been shown to exploit user trust by violating social navigation 
platforms’ terms of use agreements. The potential of “weaponizing” a social navigation 
platform should be a growing concern for three reasons: 
1. Sybil attacks are relatively cheap and “can be facilitated using free off-the-
shelf emulation software, a simple fake GPS player application, running
on a 16 core [computer] machine.”179
2. Mobile app security breaches are rapidly increasing because apps have a
minimal security framework when compared to traditional computer
systems, and the number of users is growing dramatically.180
176 John Ribeiro, “Google Earth Used by Terrorists in India Attacks,” PCWorld, November 30, 2008, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/154684/article.html. 
177 Eric Landree et al., Assessing Publicly Available Data Regarding U.S. Transportation 
Infrastructure Security (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), 6. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ben Sinai et al., Exploiting Social Navigation, 1. 
180 Bob Violino, “Mobile Apps the New Favorite for Hack Attack,” CA Technologies, October 29, 
2014, http://rewrite.ca.com/us/articles/security/mobile-apps-the-new-favorite-for-hack-attack.html. 
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3. Terrorist groups are improving their cyberattack capabilities. For example, 
ISIS has the hacking capability to launch “a major attack against 
government infrastructure,” and Distributed Denial of Service attacks have 
been a favorite attack vector for the Syrian Electronic Army and OpIsreal 
against government cites.181 Mobile applications provide a rich target 
environment for hacking activities.  
Further research is needed in each of these potential areas of vulnerability. 
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VI. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this thesis, the question was asked: “What threats do social 
media and social navigation (SMSN) pose to the surface transportation system?” Early 
on, it was noted that current literature regarding SMSN does not assess the potential 
security threats these platforms pose to surface transportation. The intent of this thesis 
was to identify those vulnerabilities, catalog them, and provide context for how those 
vulnerabilities represent threats to surface transportation security. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
While available research and open-source information is somewhat limited, three 
research groups have successfully manipulated and exploited social navigation systems 
such as Waze and Google Maps. In two cases, both social media and social navigation 
platforms were used by terrorist organizations for attack planning and intelligence 
purposes. Academic researchers have been responsible for discovering vulnerabilities in 
Google Maps and Waze by utilizing various forms of Sybil attacks.  
Waze and Google Maps provide real-time traffic information as well as 
navigational assistance to millions of commuters’ worldwide. Users are dependent on the 
data and suggested routing choices to make their travel and commuting decisions. 
However, if malicious actors are able to perform Sybil attacks, they can lure motorists 
into potential “kill boxes” in the middle of a city. An attack of this nature could be 
economically destructive to infrastructure and, of course, devastating to human lives.  
To date, malicious activities utilizing Sybil attacks on social media platforms have 
not been attributed to direct threats on surface transportation. Although there is no firm 
evidence that terrorist factions have considered this, known attributable threats have been 
aided by Google Earth mapping technologies and will almost certainly continue to 
provide intelligence as attack plans are constructed.182 Significant data already identifies 
182 Harding, “Terrorists’ Use of Google Maps”; Ribeiro, “Google Earth Used by Terrorists.” 
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public transportation as soft targets.183 The combination of surface transportation, 
applications that support mapping technologies, and the pervasive use of social media is a 
recipe for disaster. Such an attack is no longer simply a futurist consideration of fiction; it 
is a real and present danger. Web 2.0’s fundamental intent is to provide access to shared 
information—this information cannot be controlled in the presence of malicious activities 
and is subject to monitor malintent.184 Terrorist groups’ increased capacity to exploit 
these platforms and to operate without suspicion is expected to rise.185 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY RAMIFICATIONS 
Society’s reliance on technology has opened avenues for data collection that 
terrorist groups can manipulate. This app-reliance is based on ease of access and the 
consumer’s trust that information is given without maleficence. Terrorist acts involve not 
only the collection and interpretation of data, but also the possibility of manipulated data 
intended to affect the consumer’s choices.186 For example, phishing attacks are still an 
effective mechanism to lure individuals into threatening emails.187 In parallel, apps like 
Waze and Google Maps have the potential to be manipulated in order to lure a 
concentration of vehicle surface transportation to a point of attack for increased effect. 
SMSN applications can be used as weapons of destruction within surface transportation 
systems. Homeland security and transportation security professionals must be prepared to 
prevent or react to such an attack. 
In assessing our nation’s vulnerability to asymmetric attacks, the 9/11 
Commission Report identified a “lack of imagination” within our security apparatus.188 
The notion that terrorists can manipulate social media and navigation applications to steer 
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commuters into dense areas may be imaginative, but no more so than the 9/11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.189 According to Presidential Policy Directive 
21, transportation systems are viewed as a critical infrastructure sector.190 Social 
navigation applications such as Waze and Google Maps influence the operations of 
transportation systems, and therefore consideration should now be given to labeling them, 
too, as critical elements of the surface transportation infrastructure, and they should be 
secured as such.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Many view autonomous vehicles as the solution to America’s traffic congestion 
problems.191 Ride-sharing company Lyft is attempting to create a new market by 
partnering with General Motors to develop a network of autonomous ride-sharing 
vehicles (see Figure 14).192  
189 Ibid. 
190 “Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” The White House, 
February 12, 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
191 Earl Blumenauer, “Let’s Use Self-Driving Cars to Fix America’s Busted Infrastructure,” Wired, 
May 20, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/05/lets-use-self-driving-cars-fix-americas-busted-
infrastructure/. 




Figure 14.  Web 2.0 in Autonomous Vehicles193 
The upcoming wave of autonomous vehicles will certainly have a positive effect 
on surface transportation.194 However, understanding the importance of vehicle surface 
transportation security and identifying vulnerabilities in the implementation of 
autonomous vehicles should be considered as well. As has been demonstrated, SMSN 
applications and algorithms will impose their vulnerabilities upon autonomous vehicles, 
which have the potential to be used as controlled weaponized devices. Hypothetically, 
Sybil attacks could directly influence multiple autonomous vehicles to perform the 
bidding of terrorists and criminals (see Figure 15).195  
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Figure 15.  Sybil Attack in a Vehicle Area Network196 
Lastly, autonomous vehicles are expected to communicate with transportation 
infrastructure to ensure efficient and safe traffic flow.197 Vehicles are anticipated to 
convey lane positioning, travel speed, and distance to traffic signals; in turn, traffic 
signals can adjust signal timing to accommodate approaching vehicles to make traffic 
flow more efficient (see Figure 16).198 A Sybil attack or a man-in-the-middle attack on 
the traffic infrastructure and/or vehicular network could cause vehicle conflicts and 
accidents at intersections by communicating false vehicle characteristic information and 
false traffic infrastructure information. Further research is required to explore security 
196 Khaled Rabieh, Mohamed Mahmoud, Marianne Azer, and Mahmoud Allam, “A Secure and 
Privacy-Preserving Event Reporting Scheme for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: Security in Event Reporting 
Scheme,” Security and Communication Networks 8, no. 17 (March 2014): Figure 2, 
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/274731284_fig6_Figure-2-Sybil-attack-scenario-RSU-road-side-unit. 
197 “Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) Communications for Safety,” U.S. Department of Transportation, 
accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/v2isafety_factsheet.htm. 
198 This is based on my experience as a traffic and transportation engineer. 
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counter-measures that could deny malign exploitation of the booming autonomous 
vehicle industry. 
 
Figure 16.  Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Communication199 
D. FINAL REMARKS 
The present and future protection of transportation infrastructure has room for 
improvement and will require imagination to outsmart malicious actors working 
diligently to find holes within our systems. The threats posed to vehicle surface 
transportation by vulnerabilities in Web 2.0 have been explored through the lens of cyber 
security, vehicle surface transportation security, and social media exploitation. 
Vulnerabilities to social media and navigation applications have been identified and 
categorized. These vulnerabilities must now be addressed by homeland security, 
transportation, and information technology professionals. 
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